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Abstract 
The objective of the paper is to identify the causal relationships between income inequality, levels 
of democracy and economic growth in Latin America from 1996 to 2014. With this objective in 
mind, fixed and random effects models are estimated with a periodicity of growth episodes of two, 
five and ten years to analyze the impact of the variables of interest in different time horizons. The 
countries in the sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The results indicate that 
increments in the levels of democracy have a negative effect on the growth of GDP per capita in 
the two-year growth episodes, to later become positive in the fifth year and reach its maximum 
effect ten years later. This highlights the importance of the stability of political regimes for a 
country to reach a state of stationary growth. The results of the Gini variable show that higher 
levels of income inequality lead to lower economic growth. Its negative impact reaches its 
maximum five years after the shock that triggered the increase in inequality. 
 
Keywords: economic growth, income inequality, democracy, Latin America, per capita 
income, policymaking.  
Resumen 
El objetivo del artículo es identificar las relaciones causales entre la desigualdad de ingresos, los 
niveles de democracia y el crecimiento económico en América Latina de 1996 a 2014. Con este 
objetivo en mente, se estiman modelos de efectos fijos y aleatorios con una periodicidad de 
episodios de crecimiento de dos, cinco y diez años para analizar el impacto de las variables de 
interés en diferentes horizontes temporales. Los países de la muestra son Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brasil, Chile, Colombia, República Dominicana, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, México, Panamá, 
Perú y Venezuela. Los resultados indican que los incrementos en los niveles de democracia tienen 
un efecto negativo sobre el crecimiento del PIB per cápita en los episodios de crecimiento de dos 
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Esto resalta  la importancia de la  estabilidad de los  regímenes políticos para que un país alcance 
un estado de crecimiento estacionario. Los resultados de la variable Gini muestran que niveles más 
altos de desigualdad de ingresos conducen a un menor crecimiento económico. Su impacto 
negativo alcanza su máximo cinco años después del choque que desencadenó el aumento de la 
desigualdad.   
 
Palabras clave: crecimiento económico, desigualdad en el ingreso, democracia, América 
Latina, ingreso por habitante, formulación de políticas. 
 
Introduction 
The curve of Kuznets (1955) argues that the relationship between income inequality and 
growth of gross domestic product per capita has an inverted U shape. This relationship explains 
the transition from a rural to an industrial economy, a process in which inequality should increase 
in the early stages of economic development to accelerate the steady-state growth rate. Once a 
more advanced stage of growth is reached, inequality in income distribution should begin to 
decrease. However, the empirical regularity proposed by Kuznets is not automatic and generates 
conflicts and social tensions in its evolution. 
Davtyan (2016) argues that income inequality creates political conflicts that decrease the 
productivity of labor and capital, reducing growth. Furthermore, political, and economic reforms, 
which aim to increase the efficiency of productive factors, are more difficult to implement. In this 
way, economic and political institutions are being shaped little by little depending on the degree 
of concentration of income and political power, they end up being inclusive or exclusive. 
Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2005) define the former as institutions that protect the economic 
participation of most of the society and private property and encourage impartial political and 
justice systems. While the exclusive privileges some social groups over the rest, they lead to an 
increase in the concentration of political and economic power and limit the exercise of civil rights. 
In the absence of full civil, economic, and political rights, incentives are created for some 
groups in society to engage in criminal activities, from theft, drug trafficking to political 
revolutions such as guerrillas or armed groups. According to Barro (2000), the participation of 
certain sectors in crime and other activities represents an inefficient allocation of resources, which 
could be used in productive activities. In addition, they violate individual private property. In short, 
poor, and unequal countries are socio-politically unstable, their instability reduces the incentives 
to save and invest. Even worse, poor countries are socio-politically unstable, and they are poor 
because they are socio-politically unstable, (Aghion, Caroli, & García-Peñalosa, 1999) This 
implies that these countries are trapped in a vicious cycle of instability, poverty, and inequality. 
Considering the above context, the objective of the article is to identify the causal 
relationships between income inequality, levels of democracy and economic growth in Latin 
America from 1996 to 2014. With this objective in mind, fixed and random effects models are 
estimated with a periodicity of growth episodes of two, five and ten years to analyze the impact of 
the variables of interest in different time horizons. The countries in the sample are Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The results indicate that increments in the levels of democracy have 
a negative effect on the growth of GDP per capita in the two-year growth episodes, to later become 
positive in the fifth year and reach its maximum effect ten years later. This highlights the 
importance of the stability of political regimes for a country to reach a state of stationary growth. 
The results of the Gini variable show that higher levels of income inequality lead to lower 
82 
 
AGLALA ISSN 2215-7360   
2020; 11 (2): 80-93 
economic growth. Its negative impact reaches its maximum five years after the shock that triggered 
the increase in inequality. 
This paper is divided into three sections in addition to introduction and conclusion. The 
first does a literature review highlighting the empirical findings of the effects of income inequality 
and democracy on economic growth. The second presents the theoretical framework on the 
theories that explain the relationships at the macroeconomic level between inequality, democracy, 
and growth. Section three specifies the econometric methodology, the data, and the models to be 




Table 1 presents a synthesis of the literature that explores the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth, specifying whether the effect on growth is negative, positive, or 
inconclusive. Specifically, Barro (2000) exposes the non-existence of a statistically significant 
causal channel between income inequality and investment and GDP growth rates for a panel of 
100 countries from 1965 to 1995. However, Barro argues the existence of an empirical regularity 
where higher levels of inequality tend to retard growth in poor countries; but they encourage it in 
high-income countries. The variables used by Barro are the investment index (private plus public) 
over GDP, the total fertility rate and the results of international science exams, math, and tests as 
a percentage of correct answers. Its methodology is based on the use of least squares in three stages 
where the main endogenous variable changes according to the objective of the specific regression. 
Kang (2015) and Davtyan (2016) are two cases in the growth literature since they make 
use of multivariate models of time series, unlike most documents that make use of panel data 
techniques. Kang (2015) makes use of VAR and VECM models for individual Asian economies. 
The author finds that there is a tradeoff between income inequality and growth, so he suggests that 
development interventions focus on minimizing the impacts on one variable in the face of changes 
in the other. For his part, Davtyan (2016) explores the dynamic interactions between economic 
growth, inequality, and fiscal performance. For this, it uses a structural vector autoregressive 
model (SVAR) for the United Kingdom (UK), United States (USA) and Canada. Their results 
show that income inequality has a negative effect on growth in the UK; but a positive one in the 
USA and Canada. Furthermore, inequality reduces the fiscal performance of all the countries 
analyzed. Davtyan's results show the strength of making individual time series models by countries 
and not putting them all together in a data panel. With this method, the model specification can 
capture the individual characteristics of each country. 
Most inequality studies are based on comparative studies between countries through panel 
data, but the study by Panizza (2002) carries out a comparative study within the United States. The 
author uses a combination of cross sections and finds a negative relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth. In addition, it alerts on the importance of choosing the estimation 
method and the model specification, since they have an impact on the results and interpretations. 
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Effect of income inequality on economic growth 
Effect  Authors 
Negative Persson & Tabellini (1992), Alesina & Rodrik (1994), Persson & 
Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1994), Clarke (1995), Alesina & Perotti 
(1996), Perotti (1996), Panizza (2002), Sukiassyan (2004), Orozco & 
Rivera (2018). 
Positive Li & Zou (1998), Aghion & Howitt (1998), Forbes (2000). 
Inconclusive Barro (2000), Banerjee & Duflo (2003), Dominicis, Groot, & Florax 
(2006), Shin, Kim, & Yamamura (2009), Castells-Quintana & Royuela 
(2014), Shin (2012), Kang (2015), Davtyan (2016). 
Table 1. Inequality literature review. 
Table 2 presents a synthesis of the literature focused on exploring the relationship between 
levels of democracy and economic growth using the same types of negative, positive, or 
inconclusive effects. Specifically, Alesina & Rodrik (1994) study the relationship between growth 
and politics through an endogenous growth model with distributive conflicts between agents. The 
results of the proposed model show that the higher the rate of inequality of wealth and income, the 
higher the tax rate and the lower the growth. While Alesina, Özler, Roubini, & Swagel (1996) 
investigate the same relationship but empirically in a sample of 113 countries for the period from 
1950 to 1982. Their results show that countries and periods with high political instability and low 
levels of democracy reduce growth. 
 
Effect of democracy on economic growth 
Effect Authors 
Negative Persson & Tabellini (1992, 1994), Li, Squire, & Zou (2001), Keefer 
& Knack (2002). 
Positive Alesina & Perotti (1994), Alesina, Özler, Roubini, & Swagel (1996), 
Deininger & Squire (1996), Pettersson (2003), Rodrik & Wacziarg 
(2005), Altman & Castiglioni (2009), Knutsen (2013), Acemoglu, 
Naidu, Restrepo & Robinson (2019), Perea & Rivera (2020). 
Inconclusive Clarke (1995), Barro (1996), Perotti (1996), Shin (2012). 
Table 2. Democracy literature review. 
In the same line of research, Barro (1996) studies the relationship between economic 
growth and democracy; to do this, it uses a panel of 100 countries for the period from 1960 to 
1990. Its results show that the favorable effects of democracy on growth are the maintenance of 
the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption and high human capital. Furthermore, 
Barro finds a non-linear relationship between the variables, where higher levels of democracy 
increase growth at low levels of political freedom; but it is depressed by growth and a moderate 
level of freedom has already been reached. For the analyzed sample, economic development 
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Conceptual framework  
This section presents an overview of the body of theoretical research on the relationship 
between inequality, democracy, and economic growth. Explanations of the effect of income 
inequality on growth are classified into credit market imperfections, marginal propensity to save, 
and mass consumption in society. While the effects of democracy on growth can be explained by 
fiscal policy, civil, political, and economic rights. 
 
Inequality and growth 
The imperfections in the credit market are caused by the asymmetries in the information 
and the limitations of the legal institutions at a specific moment (Barro, 2000). The combination 
of the two previous failures causes inefficiencies in the financial exchange since the agents do not 
know a priori if the exchange is beneficial or if the other agents will comply with the agreed 
contracts. As a result, the credit market is characterized by being a market with heterogeneous 
agents and with variable information and wealth endowments. In this market, inequality is 
understood as differences in the capital stock and in the flow of income between the participants. 
The relationship between the functioning of the credit market and economic inequality can 
be analyzed from two different positions. The first is based on the article by Kaldor (1957) where 
it is argued that inequality in wealth and income leads to higher growth based on two arguments: 
1. The marginal propensity to save of the rich is greater than that of the poor. If it is assumed that 
the growth rate of the gross domestic product is related to the national propensity to save; the most 
unequal societies will grow faster. 2. Investment projects, the creation of new industries, research 
activities and the development or implementation of innovations involve large sunk costs. With 
imperfect credit and capital markets. 
The second position has its origin in later empirical works, one of them is that of Perotti 
(1992), where the relationship between loan and value for national mortgages is used as an 
indicator of the availability of credit in the United States. Their results show that a greater 
availability of credit for the population has a positive and significant effect on the growth rate. As 
the share of national income in the lowest two quintiles declines, capital accumulation and growth 
decline. This implies that a lower level of inequality in wealth and income allows a greater part of 
the population to access credit tools for consumption and investment. Such access takes the form 
of higher collateral in possession of the debtors, which reduces the risk of default and gives a 
higher level of confidence to the financial system (Rivera & Rivera, 2019). As a synthesis of the 
above, the distribution of income generates liquidity restrictions that affect the speed of 
accumulation of human capital and physical capital; this reduces the incentives to make new 
investments. 
Similar to Perotti (1992), Aghion, Caroli, & García-Peñalosa (1999) carry out a Ramsey-
Kass-Koopmans model where they show that inequality has the following negative effects on 
growth: 1. Inequality reduces investment opportunities 2. Inequality worsens the incentives of 
debtors to pay 3. Inequality generates macroeconomic volatility. As a solution to the above, the 
government can redistribute resources to the less gifted. By reducing inequality, it can improve 
growth and decrease the volatility of the system. Furthermore, Barro (2000) argues that an efficient 
redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor should increase savings rates; a fact that 
according to Kaldor (1957) increases the performance of the economy. 
Regarding mass consumption, Matsuyama (2002) formulates a general equilibrium model 
that focuses on firms and the impact of productivity changes on mass consumption in society. The 
author states that improvements in productivity allow a greater number of households to access a 
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consumer good through lower prices. It is important to clarify that these new households are lower 
on the income scale than households that could buy the product at its original price. Lower prices 
generate greater domestic demand, which in turn encourages greater investment in research and 
development to achieve a new productivity improvement. The above process describes in a general 
way the pattern that the expansion of mass consumption has followed in contemporary societies 
Excessive income inequality limits the proper functioning of the consumption 
massification process and its potential for investment in new technologies and industrialization. 
Lorente (2018) argues that demand stagnates in the upper strata when the income distance between 
strata is large, the reduced volume of sales does not justify carrying out new investments in capital 
or research to lower prices. In this way, growth based on mass consumption stagnates and 
incentives for innovation disappear. 
 
Democracy and inequality  
First, Pettersson (2003) defines a consolidated democracy as a political system with the 
following three characteristics: 1. A freely and fairly elected government is defeated in the 
following elections and it accepts the result 2. The democratic system has survived crisis or shocks 
in time that confirm its solidity. 3. The electoral system makes the rulers responsible through 
mechanisms of political control in the power of society.  
With this in mind, Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson (2019) argue that the positive 
transmission channels of democracy towards growth include economic reforms, greater 
investment, higher tax collection, better provision of public goods, less social instability, 
restriction on the power of dictators to command, reduction of social conflicts and the impossibility 
of that a group with political power monopolizes the most lucrative economic activities. 
Furthermore, the authors conclude that there is a strong complementarity between democratic 
institutions and proximate causes of economic growth and development. 
Considering the above, the transmission channel for the above effects is fiscal policy. 
Alesina & Perotti (1994) state that the fiscal channel allows political decisions in a democracy to 
influence development. The level of taxation and spending are the result of a voting process in 
which income or wealth are the main determinants of voters' preferences. The poor prefer a higher 
level of public spending as it has a redistributive effect. In this context, political parties compete 
for votes and once in power, the public spending they incur is determined by their popularity and 
ideology (Hernández, 2005).  
In this way, fiscal policy is not directed by technical criteria, but by changing political 
motivations that are determined by the preferences of society; preferences determined by the 
income and wealth levels of each social group (Rivera & Rivera, 2019). The motivations exposed 
by Hernández (2005) mean that in democracies where there are periodic elections, politicians in 
power incur higher public spending in election years to maximize their probability of re-election. 
The proximate consequences of this maximization process are the creation of a political budget 
cycle or political cycle. 
In dictatorial systems or failed democracies, the government's propensity to carry out bad 
public and economic policies to guarantee its political survival is greater than in consolidated 
democracies (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Knutsen, 2013). Democracy limits the 
discretionary power of the government in office and forces economic policies to be guided by 
criteria of efficiency and equity, not by political or ideological criteria. 
Regarding the civil, political, and economic rights, Knutsen (2013) argues that the vertical 
accountability mechanisms of consolidated democracies avoid failed public policies. These 
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mechanisms are free elections, free speech, free media, institutions of political control, open 
accounts, division of powers and justice systems and impartial conflict resolution. The result of 
the combination of these mechanisms minimizes the incentives that politicians must commit acts 
of corruption, repression or spending for electoral purposes. 
The biggest problem with the mechanism is that it is based on a relationship of political 
power between social groups and the state. Those who do not enjoy any type of influence will 
hardly be protected when their rights are violated (Sachs, 2002). Usually in this group without 
political power is the poorest population of each country and their social position generates losses 
in the accumulation of human capital and physical capital. Worse still, the inability to fully exercise 
their rights causes increases in criminal activities such as drug trafficking and robbery. As a 
synthesis of the previous mechanism, the excessively unequal distribution of income and political 
power generates restrictions in the exercise of the rights of some social groups that eventually leads 
to socio-political instability. 
 
Methodology 
The measure of income inequality is obtained from the standardized world income 
inequality database (SWIID), which maximizes comparability of income inequality data for the 
widest possible sample of countries and years. Specifically, the Gini index is taken after taxes and 
transfers, where 100 represents perfect inequality and 0 perfect equality (Solt, 2019).  
The variable to control democracy is taken from the Polity IV project. Specifically, polity 
variable is constructed from the weighting of the democratic and autocratic aspects of a country. 
the resulting unified policy scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) 
(Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2018). 
In addition, a vector of control variables is constructed using variables identified by Panizza 
(2002), Perroti (1996) and Barro (2000), these variables are usually correlated with growth. The 
vector of control variables is made up of the logarithm of income, human capital, fertility rate, 
percentage of urban population, percentage of population above 65 years old and government 
expending. To identify the relationship between income inequality, levels of democracy and 
economic growth in Latin America, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
Where 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  is the growth of the per capita product of country i in year t, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 captures 
the distribution of income, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 captures political stability, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  the vector of  controls, and 𝑈𝑖𝑡  
are the errors. The equation (1) is estimated using fixed and random effects, also, to obtain 
consistent results, the model is estimated with and without control variables. The periodicity of the 
estimation is defined with growth episodes of two, five and ten years to analyze the impact of the 
variables of interest in different time horizons from 1996 to 2014. Specifically, the model for two-
year growth episodes includes in its regression the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; five year episodes include 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011; and ten year 
episodes include 1996 and 2006. The countries in the sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
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Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the chosen variables.  
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Variance 
2 year growth episode 258 0,0002 0,15 -0,93 0,25 0,02 
5 year growth episode 255 0,0004 0,10 -0,38 0,17 0,01 
10 year growth episode 250 0,0004 0,07 -0,19 0,10 0,00 
Gini 260 46,15 3,93 37,10 53,00 15,48 
Democracy 260 7,53 6,18 -88,00 10,00 38,20 
Log of Income 260 9,11 0,47 8,00 9,97 0,22 
Income 260 9997 4494 2984 21340 20198109 
Human Capital 260 2,50 0,28 1,79 3,07 0,08 
Government 260 0,16 0,05 0,09 0,34 0,00 
Fertility Rate 260 2,56 0,47 1,75 4,38 0,22 
Urban 260 72,88 11,59 50,86 91,50 134,44 
Old 260 6,50 1,58 4,18 10,73 2,50 
Table 3. Summary statistics. 
 
Results  
The results of the basic model with fixed and random effects are found in Table 4. First, 
increments in the levels of democracy have a negative effect on the growth of GDP per capita in 
the two-year growth episodes, to later become positive in the fifth year and reach its maximum 
effect ten years later. This highlights the importance of the stability of political regimes for a 
country to reach a state of stationary growth (Rivera & Rivera, 2020). The initial impact of 
democracy is due to changes in the rules of the game that bring about more democratic political 
systems, that is, agents within an economy do not automatically adapt to new regulations. 
However, clear rules, respect for private property, fair political participation, functional justice 
systems, and political and civil guarantees have a positive impact on long-term growth. 
Furthermore, a higher level of democracy suggests a more stable social environment for the 
development of the citizens of a country, especially in Latin America, considering the historical 
centralization of political and economic power in a small group of people. 
 
Variable 
Lenght of Growth Episode 
2 years 5 years 10 years 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Democracy 
-0.000504* -0.000298 0.00688 -0.000530 0.00252 4.13e-05 
(0.000254) (0.000423) (0.0143) (0.0101) (0.0118) (0.00850) 
Gini 
-0.0145*** -0.00639** -0.0184*** -0.00708** -0.0120 -0.00415 
(0.00360) (0.00272) (0.00388) (0.00299) (0.0154) (0.00317) 
Constant 
0.678*** 0.298** 0.808*** 0.335*** 0.549 0.196 
(0.166) (0.124) (0.156) (0.124) (0.767) (0.172) 
Observations 129 129 51 51 25 25 
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R-squared 0.050 0.0569  0.173 0.0987 0.081 0.1259  
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 
 
Table 4. Basic regressions. Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. FE denotes fixed effects and 
RE denotes random effects. * refers to a parameter which is statistically significant at 10%, ** at 
5% and *** 1%. 
 
The results of the Gini variable show that higher levels of income inequality lead to lower 
economic growth. Its negative impact reaches its maximum five years after the shock that triggered 
the increase in inequality. Furthermore, most of the coefficients obtained for these variables are 
significant at 5%, which shows that the causal channels suggested in the literature review section 
are functional. 
The previous results contradict the results of studies that favor the accumulation of physical 
and human capital regardless of their distribution. It is clear that in order to improve the standard 
of living of its inhabitants, it is mandatory to expand the productive capacity of its economy, 
however, social policies in charge of minimizing the social friction generated by the growth 
process are also central to a country's development. Putting these policies aside implies that certain 
sectors accumulate discontent to, eventually, generate social unrest and political violence. 
The results of the extended model with fixed and random effects are found in Table 5. 
Unlike the results without control variables, the impact of democracy on growth is positive for all 
growth episodes considered. This situation occurs due to the natural interaction that fiscal policy 
has with the other variables of an economy, such as the accumulation of human capital and the 
urban population. On the other hand, the relationship of income inequality with other variables 
means that its impact on growth is not constant. An example of this is its relationship with capital 
accumulation, a better level of income distribution and wealth delay the volume of investment that 
fewer people could make. Similarly, faster capital accumulation leads to higher levels of growth, 
in this case, the interaction of income distribution with capital leads to a positive relationship of 
the variable of interest. In any case, the global and long-term effect of the variable is positive, as 
observed in the model for ten-year growth episodes. 
The logarithm of income has a positive relationship with the study variable. The logic of 
the inclusion of this variable points to the massification of consumption and the investment 
potential of a population. The process of development and economic growth has a high correlation 
component towards past economic results, that is, jumps in the living standards of the inhabitants 
are not automatic, there are intermediate steps between two points. In this way, the past or present 
income of a typical inhabitant of Latin America is an excellent indicator of their potential future 
income. Regarding the impact of human capital, its causal relationships occur through better 
qualified labor and a greater potential for the generation of applicable scientific knowledge. These 
two variables have the potential to grow together in a positive feedback process, where a higher 
level of education leads to a higher level of income, which increases the possibility of accessing 
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Variable 
Lenght of Growth Episode 
2 years 5 years 10 years 
FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Democracy 
-0.000696* 0.000122 0.0110 0.00637 0.0103 0.00417 
(0.000358) (0.000577) (0.0142) (0.0107) (0.00831) (0.00814) 
Gini 
0.0434** -0.00373 0.0253** -0.00542 0.0289* -0.00292 
(0.0168) (0.00340) (0.00965) (0.00362) (0.0134) (0.00259) 
Log of 
Income 
0.229 -0.0113 0.238 0.0167 0.203** 0.0583 
(0.155) (0.0734) (0.146) (0.0665) (0.0840) (0.0631) 
Human 
Capital 
-0.145 0.0736 -0.0661 0.0750 -0.231 0.0183 
(0.201) (0.0703) (0.193) (0.0626) (0.236) (0.0520) 
Fertility 
Rate 
-0.357*** -0.126*** -0.279** -0.0988*** -0.193** -0.0511** 
(0.110) (0.0257) (0.102) (0.0209) (0.0746) (0.0231) 
Urban 
0.00537 -0.000196 -0.000556 0.000276 0.000658 -0.000254 
(0.00653) (0.00105) (0.00596) (0.000943) (0.00988) (0.000908) 
Old 
-0.00163 -0.0159*** -0.0368 -0.0222** -0.0405 -0.0153* 
(0.0494) (0.00424) (0.0592) (0.00910) (0.0557) (0.00882) 
Government 
-1.069 -0.638 -0.480 -0.266 -0.490 0.0264 
(0.667) (0.491) (0.522) (0.401) (0.452) (0.248) 
Constant 
-3.019* 0.633 -2.172* 0.290 -1.914** -0.218 
(1.447) (0.653) (1.128) (0.601) (0.811) (0.604) 
Observations 129 129 51 51 25 25 
R-squared 0.404 0.3784 0.681 0.5730 0.826 0.7935 
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 
 
Table 5. Expanded regressions. Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. FE denotes fixed effects 
and RE denotes random effects. * refers to a parameter which is statistically significant at 10%, 
** at 5% and *** 1%. 
 
The expanded model makes it possible to identify a stylized fact in the demographics of 
the Latin American countries. Fertility levels and the percentage of the population over 65 years 
old have a negative relationship with the economic growth observed in all the growth episodes 
considered. The explanation, again, has to do with the distribution of income and the consumption 
potential of a population. Rivera & Rivera (2020) show that the demographic growth of the region 
during the 20th century was faster than the expansion of GDP, with this, the part of the income 
that corresponds to each inhabitant is less, making it difficult to accumulate physical and human 
capital. The negative impact of the population over 65 years old is due to the ineffectiveness of the 
security systems in Latin America, where the majority of retirees do not have a stable source of 
income due to high levels of informality. Furthermore, the population that achieves a pension 
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Graph 1. Relationship between growth, democracy, and inequality. 
 
Graph 1 shows the discovered relationship between income inequality, democracy, and 
economic growth. In addition to the direction of the effects already mentioned, it is found that the 
stability of these variables matters. Going from a political or civil state to a better or worse state 
very quickly, causes distributive disturbances that hinder economic activity. This supports 
economic and social policies that lead Latin American societies to a desirable state with 
progressive and planned processes. In this environment, the consistency of fiscal policy becomes 
one of the greatest challenges for fiscal policy, changes in regimes and political ideologies change 
the motivations and assumptions that public spending should have. The relationships between 
inequality, democracy and growth are intricate, that does not mean that it is impossible to 
determine the impacts that one variable has on the other. As already mentioned, higher levels of 
democracy and lower levels of inequality in the distribution of wealth and income generate higher 
levels of growth, and also make it sustainable. Despite these findings, the positions of governments 
are changing, so they cannot carry out sustainable and consistent social plans.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper managed to identify the causal relationships between income inequality, levels 
of democracy and economic growth in Latin America from 1996 to 2014. Further, thanks to the 
literature review and conceptual framework carried out, it was possible to establish the causal 
explanation that each of these variables plays economic growth under the vision of growth by 
accumulation of factors, by innovation and institutional hypotheses. 
First, inequality has the following negative effects on growth: 1. Inequality reduces 
investment opportunities 2. Inequality worsens the incentives of debtors to pay 3. Inequality 
generates macroeconomic volatility. As a solution to the above, the government can redistribute 
resources to the less gifted. By reducing inequality, it can improve growth and decrease the 
volatility of the system. Second, the positive transmission channels of democracy towards growth 
include economic reforms, greater investment, higher tax collection, better provision of public 
goods, less social instability, restriction on the power of dictators to command, reduction of social 
conflicts and the impossibility of that a group with political power monopolizes the most lucrative 
economic activities.  
The results of the estimated models indicate that increments in the levels of democracy 
have a negative effect on the growth of GDP per capita in the two-year growth episodes, to later 
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importance of the stability of political regimes for a country to reach a state of stationary growth. 
The results of the Gini variable show that higher levels of income inequality lead to lower 
economic growth. Its negative impact reaches its maximum five years after the shock that triggered 
the increase in inequality.  
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